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NOTES
PRICE-MAINTENANCE PRACTICES AS "UNFAIR METHODS OF COM-
PETITION" UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AcT-That
"the state of the law as to price maintenance may rightly be said to
be in confusion" I is amply demonstrated by the eight appeals 2 from
"cease and desist orders" of the Federal Trade Commission which
have been decided in the Circuit Courts in the past two years. These
cases, together with the leading case,3 are the only ones in which the
power of the Commission to terminate price maintenance schemes has
been tested. None of them has squarely decided that a manufacturer
or trader may make no attempt of any sort to maintain resale prices;
none has held that price maintenance itself is an "unfair method of
competition"; 4 yet all but one 5 have held that most of the practices
found and enjoined by the Commission, which practices tend to effect
price maintenance, are in themselves unfair methods of competition.
It is in the determination of what practices are unfair and in the rea-
soning leading thereto that confusion has arisen. In avoiding a square
decision on price maintenance the courts may have been influenced by
two things: first, they have been compelled to plot their course from
earlier decisions; second, they may have entertained some doubt as
to whether the fixing of reasonable resale prices is of those practices
"heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals" or "against public
policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competi-
tion or create monopoly." I Whether price maintenance itself is eco-
nomically sound or unsound,7 whether it was legislatively intended to
'Circuit Judge Denison, in Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, ii Fed. (2d) 337, 340 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
'Butterick Co. v. F. T. C., 4 Fed. (2d) 91o (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Oppen-
heim, Obendorf & Co. v. F. T. C., 5 Fed. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925);
American Tobacco Co. v. F. T. C., 9 Fed. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) ; Hill
Bros. v. F. T. C., 9 Fed. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). Toledo Pipe-Thread-
ing Machine Co. v. F. T. C., supra, note I; Moir et at. v. F. T. C., 12 Fed. (2d)
(C. C. A. Ist, 1926); Q. R. S. Music Co. v. F. T. C., 12 Fed. (2d) 730
C. A. 8th, 1926). Since going to press, an interesting decision vacating an order
of the Commission has been handed down in Ayer v. F. T. C., UNITED STATES
DAILY, Dec. 2, 1926, p. 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). This case will be discussed in
the February issue.
'F. T. C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (I922).
' Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), U. S. Comp. Stat.
(1918) § 8836e. The bill in its original form used the phrase "unfair competi-
tion." For a history of the judicial and statutory meanings that have been
given the phrase, see Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition, 29 YALE
L. J. I (I919).
'American Tobacco Co. v. F. T. C., supra, note 2.
"McReynolds, J., in F. T. C. v. Gratz et al., 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920).
" See Rogers, Predatory Price-Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 HARV. L. REv.
139 (1913) ; Miller, The Maintenance of Uniform Resale Prices, 63 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 22 (1914) ; Shall There be Legislation Permitting Maintenance of
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be included in the indefinite phrase of the Trade Commission Act,"
are controversies beyond the scope of this note.
The leading cases on price-maintenance, and those upon which
most of the subsequent decisions have been based, are Dr. Miles Medi-
cal Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.9 and United States v. Colgate
& Co. 0
The Dr. Miles Co. manufactured medicines by an unpatented,
secret process, and, under a trade-mark, sold to jobbers who resold to
retailers. Sales were made, and resales allowed, only to "accredited
agents," that is, to those jobbers and retailers who had signed agree-
ments purporting to be agency contracts. These contracts fixed both
wholesale and retail resale prices and the seller covenanted that he
would sell to no dealer not on the lists furnished by the company.
Further, each package was distinctively marked and a record of its
disposition turned back to the company. Violations terminated the
contract. The Dr. Miles Co. prayed an injunction alleging that the
respondent refused to enter into the contract, induced others to
violate their contracts, resold at cut prices to attract "patronage for
other merchandise," and obliterated the identification marks. A
demurrer to the bill was sustained below, and judgment upon it af-
firmed," because there was revealed a system of contracts of sale
"obnoxious not only to the Statute-of Congress against restraints and
monopolies in respect of interstate trade but inimical also to the rea-
sonable restraints which at common law may be imposed as ancil-
lary to a principal contract." 12  The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment on the purely technical ground that the bill lacked a cer-
tain allegation."" It did not directly declare that such contracts were
Resale Prices? 48 Claw. L.a. N. 294, 2o LAw Noms 28 (1916) ; Gleick, Price
Maintenance, 24 CASE AND CoU., 125-133, 193-203 (i917); Stevens, Resale
Price Maintenance as Unifair Competition, ig CoL. L. REv. 265 (i919); Right
of Manufacturer, Producer or Wholesaler to Control Resale Prices, 7 A. L. R.
449 (I92o); KALEs, CONTRACTS AND CO MBIAToNs IN RESTAUINT OV TRADE,
§§31-46 (1918). See also, Foulke, The Federal Anti-Trust Act, 62 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 241, 252 (1913). For excellent discussion of the opposing theories of
the trader and the Commission, see HEDERsoN, THE FEDERAL TRADE Com-
mISSION, 287-30o (1924).
'See Barrett, The Federal Trade Commission, PROCEEDINGS Ky. S. B. A.
(1915) 84; Young, The Sherman Act and the New Anli-Trust Legislation, 23
J. Poi. EcoN. 3o5-326 (1915) ; F. T. C. v. Gratz et al., supra, note 6, at 436.
'220 U. S. 373 (191).
10250 U. S. 300 (1919).
164 Fed. 8o3 (C. C. A. 6th, i9o8), opinion by Lurton, J.
"Ibid., 807.
"The wholesale contracts covered only consignments direct from the Miles
Co. to the wholesaler. The court said that 'the bill failed to show that the
wholesalers in collusion with the Park Co. had obtained these goods directly,
hence was insufficient This objection was raised for the first time in the ma-
jority opinion. Holmes, I., dissented from this construction of the bill.
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in violation of either statute or common law, but approved Mr. Jus-
tice Lurton's statement to that effect concerning similar agreements
in an earlier case.
14
In the Colgate case, the defendant was indicted for engaging in
an alleged combination with wholesalers and retailers to suppress
competition in violation of the the Sherman Act.' 5 The indictment
charged the maintenance of resale prices by distributing price lists to
dealers, requiring assurances that they would observe suggested
prices, threatening and refusing to sell to "offenders," listing such
dealers, and soliciting information from other dealers about viola-
tions. The District Judge, in sustaining a demurrer, felt that the in-
dictment presented the question of whether the manufacturer was
guilty of criminal combination "because he agrees with his wholesale
and retail customers upon prices," and concluded that, though he
would be guilty had he done so fraudulently or collusively, it does not
follow that he may not "refuse absolutely . . . to sell at a
named sum to a customer, with the understanding that such cus-
tomer will resell only at an agreed price between them, and, should
the customer not observe the understanding as to retail prices, exer-
cise his undoubted right to decline further to deal with such person."
The court added, "The pregnant fact should never be lost sight of that
no averment is made of any contract or agreement . . . fur-
ther than is involved in the circumstance that the manufacturer . . .
refused to sell to persons who would not resell at indicated prices,
and that certain retailers made purchases on this condition, whereas,
inferentially, others declined so to do." 16 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment.'7 Mr. Justice MciReynolds said the lower
court's construction of the charge must be accepted, and, therefore,
the indictment was insufficient. The opinion included two statements
upon which the lower courts subsequently seized:
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the Act does not restrict the long recognized right
of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private busi-
ness, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may an-
nounce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse
to sell."
14 Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o7). In the Miles case
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented (220 U. S. at 410). His interesting opinion
shows that he considered the decision not only legally, but economically un-
sound in "permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices."
"26 Stat. 2oW (i8go), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) § 882o et seq.
a6253 Fed. 522, 525, 527 (E. D. Va. 1918). (Italics mine.)
"7 Supra, note IO.
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"In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. the
unlawful combination was effected through contracts which un-
dertook to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to
sell." I
With the Colgate case newly decided, in the latter part of 1919
and early in 192o the price maintenance problem was presented to
the Federal Courts in three forms: a civil suit for damages by a jobber
against a manufacturer, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Frey & Son; "I a
criminal indictment under the Sherman Act, United States v. Schra-
der's Son; 2o and the first appeal from an order of the Federal Trade
Commission directed against methods of price maintenance, Beech-
Nut Packing Co. v. F. T. C.2"
The Frey Company had begun suit in the District Court against
the Cudahy Company, manufacturers of Old Dutch Cleanser.12 The
defendant maintained a loose system of fixed resale prices among
wholesalers only. The plaintiff, because he had undersold other
wholesalers, was refused the defendant's goods at the usual price;
the latter was willing to sell only at a price which would prevent de-
fendant's price-cutting. The plaintiff recovered damages below, but
the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment because it was
of the opinion that the defendant's method of doing business, cou-
pled with the acquiescence of its customers, was not such co-operation
between seller and purchasers as amounted to a combination in re-
straint of trade under the doctrin& of the Miles case as interpreted
in the Colgate case.
In United States v. Schrader's Son the defendant was indicted
for an alleged combination with wholesalers only to maintain resale
prices by contracts fixing prices, by lists of prices, by threats to cut
off and refusals to deal with "offenders." The District Court, in
holding the defendant not guilty under the Sherman Act, was trou-
bled by the Miles and Colgate cases, and said, "The difference is
that in the former the arrangement for marketing its product was
put in writing, whereas in the latter the wholesale and retail dealers
observed the prices fixed by the Vendor. This is a distinction without
a difference." The court distinguished the case before it from the
Miles case in that the latter involved the suppression of retail com-
petition.
2
8
is25o U. S. at 3o7. Cf. Clayton Act, §3, 38 Stat 731 (1914), U. S. Comp.
Stat. (1918) §8835c.
'261 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919).
"264 Fed. 175 (N. D. Ohio, igig).
21264 Fed. 885 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
" Special appearance, 228 Fed. 2o9 (915); demurrer overruled, 232 Fed.
640 (xgi6) ; modified judgment entered after verdict, 243 Fed. 2o5 (197).
'The demurrer in the Schrader case was sustained on the ground that the
indictment failed to show "a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly" and
"acts adequate so to do" such as were revealed in the Miles bill.
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Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. F. T. C. was brought in the form of
a petition to reverse the order issued by the Commission.24  It had
been found that the Beech-Nut Company maintained wholesale and
retail resale prices by issuing lists and letters showing resale prices,
by requesting the adherence of dealers and prohibiting them from
dealing with "offenders," by reinstating such "offenders" upon as-
surances that they would thereafter conform, by refusing to deal
directly or indirectly with mail-order houses, by maintaining "Do
Not Sell" lists, by employing its salesmen and customers to report
violations, and by marking all packages so that they could be traced.
It was further found that this merchandising conduct "does not
constitute a contract or contracts whereby resale prices are fixed,
maintained and enforced." 25 The company was ordered not to bring
about fixed resale prices "by any means" and "more particularly
by" refusing to sell to non-adherents to the Beech-Nut policy or to
others selling to such non-adherents, by "securing or seeking to se-
cure the co-operation of its distributors" in enforcing any such sys-
tem; by "carrying out or causing others to carry out a resale price-
maintenance policy by any other means." The order was reversed
on the authority of the Colgate case. The court distinguished the
Miles and Colgate cases on the absence of agreements in the latter,
but expressed doubt as to the reality of the distinction.26
These three cases were appealed to the Supreme Court. The
Frey and Schrader cases were affirmed. The Beech-Nut case was
reversed.
In affirming the Schrader decision 27 in favor of the defendant,
the court said that the Miles case had been neither overruled nor
modified by the Colgate case, and reiterated the distinction urged in
the latter between control of resale prices by agreements, express or
implied, and by mere refusal to deal with those considered unde-
sirable by the manufacturer."
The judgment in the Frey case was affirmed 29 on a ground not
"Supra, note 21. For complete complaint, findings and order, see i F. T.
C. D. 516 (ig1g).
'This finding formed the basis of Mr. Justice McReynolds' dissent, infra,
note 31.
'Circuit Judge Manton concurring, thought the power of the Commis-
sion should not be tested by the Sherman Act; yet he felt the Colgate decision
binding.
T 252 U. S. 85 (92O).
"8 252 U. S. at 99: "It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious differ-
ence between the situation presented when a manufacturer merely indicates his
wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings with all who fail to ob-
serve them, and one where he enters into agreements-whether express or im-
plied from a course of dealing or other circumstances-with all customers
throughout the different States which undertake to bind them to observe fixed
resale prices."
"256 U. S. 2o8 (1921). The court found error in the Circuit Judge's de-
cision. The latter's reversal was nevertheless affirmed because error was found
also in the trial judge's charge. The privilege of a new trial had been waived.
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directly involving the distinction above, but again Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds said, "The essential agreement, combination or con-
spiracy might be implied from a course of dealing or other circum-
stances."
In the Beech-Nut case, the Supreme Court re-entered, in a
modified form, the Commission's order, which had been vacated
below.80 Mr. Justice Day declared again the principle of the preceding
cases that one may sell to whom he pleases, but he may not go be-
yond this and "by contracts or combinations, express or implied, un-
duly hinder" interstate trade; that those cases were decided under
the Sherman Act; that "The Sherman Act is not involved here ex-
cept in so far as it shows a declaration of public policy to be
considered in determining what are unfair methods of competition,
which the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to condemn
and suppress"; that the Beech-Nut system goes far beyond a simple
refusal to sell since it "restrains the natural flow of commerce" be-
cause it "constrains the trader" to maintain the suggested prices.
The court, however, found the order too broad and modified it to
terminate "co-operative methods in which the respondent and its
distributors, customers and agents undertake to prevent others from
obtaining the company's products at less than the prices designated
by it" by the practice of reporting the names of dealers, by "Do Not
Sell" lists, by employing salesmen to assist by reporting dealers and
approving orders only of conforming dealers, by use of identification
marks, "or by utilizing any other equivalent co-operative means of
accomplishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company." 31
The five cases just discussed have formed the basis of all but
the first of the eight subsequent decisions in the circuit courts3 2 In
the Butterick case, the Commission found 3 3 that the Butterick Co.
had purported agency contracts with retailers which fixed resale
prices and excluded the retailers from handling the dress patterns, of
competing manufacturers. The order commanded them to desist
from selling their patterns upon any such "contract, agreement or
understanding." The order was affirmed. The case was decided
under the Clayton Act"' without alluding to the cases above.
"Supra, note 3.
Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom Justices McKenna and Brandeis con-
curred, dissented because he could not see "how it is unfair competition to say
to those to whom the respondent sells, and to the world, you can have m.
goods only on the terms that I propose, when the existence of any competition
in dealing with them depends upon the respondent's will." Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds dissented because of the express finding that there was no contract. Oth-
erwise he should have thought "the detailed facts sufficient to support a finding
that there were such agreements." See, supra, note 25.
*2Supra, note 2.
'See 6 F. T. C. D. 310 (923) for complete complaint, findings and order.
"Supra, note 18. The decision might well have been rested upon the Miles
group of cases but the court used Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston
Co., 258 U. S. 346 (1922) as its basis.
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In the Oppenheim case,35 the Commission found a method of
maintaining resale prices among wholesalers only by issuing price-
lists and requesting that they be followed, by keeping "Do Not Sell"
lists, and by approving of and acting upon reports of jobbers. The
respondent was ordered not to obtain reports from jobbers, not to
keep "Do Not Sell" lists, not to employ its salesmen in repotting
dealers, and not to use any other "equivalent co-operative means" of
price fixing. The order was affirmed on the authority of the Beech-
Nut case. Two differences were found; here retailers were not in-
volved, which was held not to "affect the principle"; there was no
marking system, but its absence did not "affect the illegality of
the other means to that end condemned by the Supreme Court."
The American Tobacco case 11 seriously disturbed whatever
uniformity seemed to be developing in price-maintenance cases. The
complaint, issued against an unincorporated association of whole-
salers, the American Tobacco Company, and another, charged a
system of uniform wholesale price maintenance by the association
by notices, intimidation, persuasion, reports by members, and the
employment of a spy. The manufacturer, the American Tobacco
Company, assisted by acting upon the association's recommendations
to threaten to cut off and by cutting off the supplies of "offenders,"
whether members or non-members. It was specifically found that
the tobacco company "agreed with the said association and its mem-
bers to hel1Y them maintain the price agreements." An order issued
against the association, and the tobacco company was further or-
dered to desist "from assisting and from agreeing to assist any of
its dealer-customers in maintaining . . . resale prices . . . fixed
by any such dealer-customer by agreement, understanding or com-
bination with any other dealer-customer." The court reversed that
part of the order which referred to the company. After a thorough
review of the testimony before the Commission it appeared to the
court "that what the American Tobacco Company did was not to
enter into any price-fixing agreement with any other manufacturers
as to the price of its products to the wholesalers or to the retailers
or to the public. It simply would not sell to any wholesaler or jobber
in the Philadelphia territory, if it found that he was selling to the
retailers at a price less than that fixed" by the association.37 Though
the court reviewed and distinguished many cases, their decision seems
to rest on their own "finding" just quoted; such conduct they con-
sidered neither unfair nor unreasonable.3 8
Oppenheim, Obendorf & Co. v. F. T. C., supra, note 2. See 7 F. T. C. D.
461 (1924).
" American Tobacco Co. v. F. T. C., supra, note 2. See 7 F. T. C. D.
255 (1924).
79 Fed. (2d) at 576.
M The court, it would appear, restated the case in terms of Mr. Justice
McReynolds' distinction in the Colgate and Schrader cases. To do this it not
only examined the testimony but ignored the Commission's finding of agree-
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That this case is "fundamentally in conflict" with the Hill case
which followed it,39 seems a justifiable statement. In the latter,4"
minimum retail prices on coffee were maintained by the usual meth-
ods of price-lists, reports by salesmen and customers, refusals to
sell, "Do Not Sell" lists. The order was affirmed on the authority
of the Beech-Nut case from which it was said to differ "in degree
and not in kind."
The next case to arise resembled the Colgate case on its facts
but was, if anything, milder. The Toledo Co.4 1 sold to retailers. It
solicited assurances, employed its agents as investigators, and threat-
ened to and did cut off chronic "offenders." There were no express
contracts, no employees delegated to investigation only, no "Do Not
Sell" lists, no marking of goods, no effort to prevent an "offender"
from getting his supplies from another. Judge Denison examined
all the cases and found it impossible to determine where the line
should be drawn, for the Colgate and American Tobacco cases,
stronger than the principal case, pointed one way, the Hill and Beech-
Nut cases the other. He concluded that the decision must be con-
trolled by the order in the latter. Even then he felt himself uncertain
whether the practices were condemned individually or in combination.
He found it impossible to determine what were "co-operative meth-
ods," what was "merely refusal to sell." So much of the order as
affected assurances was affirmed; that part commanding the com-
pany to desist from "seeking the co-operation of dealers" by mani-
festing an intention to act on their reports, by announcing its inten-
tion to cut off price-cutters, and employing its salesmen to investigate,
was vacated.
In the Moir case,42 the methods were somewhat stronger. After
examining the decisions from the Miles to the Hill case, the court
affirmed the order, not only as to its prohibitions covering contracts,
agreements, understandings, assurances, and solicitation of reports,
but also as to its provision enjoining the respondent from seeking
the co-operation of dealers by manifesting to them an intention to act
ments between the association and the company. It thought, with dissenting
Commissioner Van Fleet, that the evidence did not rise "above the dignity of
mere suspicion." But by the Act, the findings of the Commission are con-
clusive upon the court, and this provision was approved by Chief Justice Taft
in a dictum in F. T. C. v. Curtis Co., 260 U. S. 568, 582 (1923). An action
begun by the Royal Baking Powder Company against the Commission, in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, may ultimately determine the
validity of this part of the statute.
' Circuit Judge Denison, in the Toledo case, supra, note I, at 341.
"Hill Bros. v. F. T. C., supra, note 2. The text of the order is not yet
published, and it is not quoted in the opinion, but it is described by the court
as being in the form prescribed by the Supreme Court in the Beech-Nut case.
"1Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. F. T. C., supra, note i. The find-
ings and order are given in the opinion. Part of the case dealing with dis-
crimination in discounts is not discussed here.
a Moir et aL. v. F. T. C., supra, note 2.
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upon reports sent in by them, "by the elimination of the price-cutter,"
or by informing dealers that price-cutters would be refused further
sales: just the sort of clause that was vacated in the previous case
was here affirmed.
In the Q. R. S. Music Co. case,43 the company had written con-
tracts with retailers which, it admitted, were sales contracts and pro-
vided for "exclusive dealing" in its music rolls. These contracts were
clearly in violation of the Clayton Act and were dealt with in the
Commission's order. The company did not use them as a means of
fixing resale prices, but accomplished that end by the usual informal
means. The order again enjoined contracts, agreements and under-
standings, and the employment of salesmen and dealers in the scheme,
but added, unlike the previous two cases, a general clause enjoining
other means. The whole was affirmed on the authority of the
Beech-Nut case.
The use of a terminal general clause has brought about perhaps
the most interesting of all the decisions, in the Cream of Wheat
case,4" the most recent. Until 1913, the Cream of Wheat Company
maintained a uniform wholesale resale price through contracts. At
that time it changed its policy, cancelled the contracts and announced
to its customers that it wished to make no agreements, express or im-
plied, but that since it was undoubtedly its legal right to select its
customers, it would surely exercise this right when a customer did not
follow its "suggestions" as to resale prices. 45 It refused to sell to
mail-order houses and buying pools, and was very cautious about
chain stores. The company apprehended "offenders" by re-
ports from salesmen and customers; it requested its customers not
to supply "offenders," under penalty of being cut off; it listed
"offenders," and, while under suspicion, sent them marked goods.
It was ordered to cease its "co-operative methods" of seeking and
securing agreements, soliciting reports from customers, "requiring"
them not to sell to price-cutters, and secure assurances from them,
furnishing its agents with names of price-cutters, requiring extra
prices from price-cutters; and the general clause, "or by utilizing any
other equivalent co-operative means of accomplishing the mainte-
nance of prices fixed by respondent." To this the respondent ob-
jected so strenuously that, though the court believed it should be
construed by ejusdem generis, it affirmed the order with the addition
of this interesting proviso suggested by the respondent : 468 "Provided,
however, that nothing herein shall prevent the respondent from per-
forming the following acts: (a) Requesting its customers not to re-
" Q. R. S. Music Co. v. F. T. C., supra, note 2. See 7 F. T. C. D. 412
(i924).
"Cream of Wheat Co. v. F. T. C., supra, note 2.
4'This right it demonstrated in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cream of Wheat Co., 224 Fed. 566 (S. D. N. Y. 1915), 227 Fed. 46 (C. C. A.
2d, 1915).
46 14 Fed. (2d) at 50.
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sell Cream of Wheat at less than a stated minimum price; (b)
Refusing to sell a customer, because he resells below such requested
minimum price, or because of other reasons; (c) Announcing in
advance its intention thus to refuse; (d) Informing itself, through
its soliciting agents, and through publicly circulated advertisements of
customers which come to its attention, and through other legitimate
means, without any co-operative action with its other customers or
other persons, as to the prices at which Cream of Wheat is being
sold." 47
This amendment makes this the first order of the Commission
stating affirmatively what the respondent may do. It is difficult to
see why, under this proviso, resale at stated prices is not, as a prac-
tical matter, still a condition precedent to the dealer's right to pur-
chase. For example, the company may no longer keep a "Do Not
Sell" list. But every time it apprehends an "offender" it may write
to him requesting him to resell, hereafter, at suggested prices. There
is nothing at all to prevent the company from filing copies of such
letters and having what virtually amounts to a "Do 'Not Sell" list.
Two opposed forces were created by the Miles and Colgate cases: this
last order is their ineluctable resultant.
It is submitted that the decisions affecting price-fixing have
done two things. First, had the courts allowed the practices which
they have prohibited, the effect would have been to permit the seller
of an article directly to fix its resale price; their restrictions have
prevented him theoretically from fixing price, but he can still make it
so desirable for the dealer to maintain the price that the schedule will
be practically effected. Refused the sanction of law, the manufac-
turer has been allowed the club of business expediency. Second, by
refusing, on the one hand, to aid him aggressively, and by enjoin-
ing certain of his practices, on the other, the courts have consider-
ably weakened his grip on the club.
In this state of affairs, it is to be hoped "that ultimately either
the principle that price maintenance is an evil, and may not be ac-
complished in any manner, or the principle that such a system may
be established and enforced in any non-oppressive way, will clearly
prevail." 48  The problem has already been before Congress in the
shape of price-maintenance bills, and it is to that body that one may
look to solve it. In the interim, a. clear statement as to just which
practices are fair and which are unfair would do much to clear up
the obvious confusion of the courts. The Supreme Court has this
opportunity in the Anerican Tobacco case which is now before it on
certiorari.49
E.S.W.
Cf. this result with that of the Moir case, supra, p.
"Judge Denison in the Toledo case, supra, note i, at 342.
"27o U. S. 638 (1926).
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JURISDICTION OF EQUITY OVER LIBELS AFFECTING TRADE-
There has been much discussion of the extent of the jurisdiction of
equity to grant injunctions against libels, and in one situation particu-
larly has there been an absence of any clear statement of the law-
the jurisdiction to restrain trade libels. The question arose recently
in a Federal District Court of Massachusetts when a preliminary
injunction was sought and obtained against the Watch and Ward
Society, restraining it from threatening the distributors of the "Amer-
ican Mercury" magazine with prosecution, if they circulated a cer-
tain issue of the magazine. The injunction also restrained it from
such conduct with respect to future issues.' The reason for the
threats was that in the opinion of the defendant a certain article was
indecent, obscene, and against the law. It also appeared that the de-
fendant had previously, after such warnings, immediately prosecuted
the supposed offenders, and there is no allegation of bad faith on the
defendant's part. There was no desire to injure the plaintiff, but it
was a bona fide attempt to guard the morals of the community.
Partially for historical reasons the courts of this country have
steadily refusd to interfere by injunction where a mere libel of the
plaintiff's business is in question. Some of the typical cases are ones
in which the libels consisted of repeated statements that the plaintiff's
goods were unsatisfactory and inferior; 2 or that his credit and
business standing were not good; ' or that he intended to go out of
business; 4 or other similar libel upon his business.5 On the other
hand there are many cases which involved not merely a libel, but
some other tort which the court had undoubted jurisdiction to re-
strain, as where the libel consisted in carrying banners bearing deroga-
tory remarks concerning the plaintiff's business in the street in front
of his restaurant. The court granted the injunction on the ground
that it was a nuisance as well as a libel.6 There are similar cases in
which an illegal intimidation of employees was involved in the libel 7
and where threats of force and an illegal boycott were a part of the
injury.8
It is somewhere between these two classes of cases-the one
where a pure libel is involved and the other where some other prop-
erty right was involved, that the principal case falls. Perhaps the
cases most analogous to the "American Mercury" case are those in
American Mercury v. Chase, 13 Fed. (2) 224 (D. C. Mass. 1925).
'Marlin v. Shields, 17i N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902).
'Citizens' Light Co. v. Montgomery Light Co., i7i Fed. 553 (C. C. Ala.
i9o9).
'Baltimore Insurance Co. v. Gleisner, 202 Pa. 356, 5I Ati. io24 (1902).
'Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Domestic Manufacturing Co., 49 Ga. 70
(0873).
Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 69, 17 N. E. 307 (i888).
'Coeur D'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 5i Fed. 260 (C. C. Idaho,
1892).
'Beck v. Teamsters' Union, ii8 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (i898).
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which an injunction is sought because the defendant has communi-
cated to others that the plaintiff is infringing his patents. Such com-
munications, whether in the form of threats of suits against people
dealing with the plaintiff or not, have the undoubted effect of reduc-
ing a desire to deal with him. But the decisions in these patent cases
have not been uniform and they require some analysis. The first im-
portant one and the one most frequently cited is Boston Diatite Co. v.
Florence Manufacturing Co.,9 in which an injunction against one for
slander of title to letters patent was refused on the general ground
that since no property right was involved equity had no jurisdiction.
This case was soon afterwards approved and followed in two federal
cases, Kidd v. Horry'0 and Baltimore Car-Wheel Co. v. Bemis,"'
with the additional reason given that "libel is particularly adapted to
trial by jury." But in Emack v. Kane ' the injunction was granted,
the court distinguishing that case from Kidd v. Horry,8 and Balti-
more Co. v. Bemis," on the ground that the threat of suits against
anyone using plaintiff's infringing goods was intimidation and for
that reason under the control of equity.
But that test was soon questioned and discarded in Kelly v.
Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Co.,' 5 the couit refusing to grant the injunction
in spite of the threats contained in the circulars. The court found
that the defendant had already started three infringement suits and
that the threats were not for the sole purpose of injuring the plain-
tiff's business but were to preverit the possibility of more suits if
people were not warned of the infringement. The court said also
that it was more of a kindness than otherwise to warn people in such
a situation if the warning was bona fide. The test laid down by the
court was that "if the language of such circulars be false, malicious,
offensive or opprobrious or used for the wilful purpose of inflicting
an injury, the party is entitled to his remedy by injunction; and this
is the extent to which the authorities go." In Warren v. Landauer'6
the court also refused an injunction because bad faith had not been
shown, in effect the same rule as in Kelly v. Ypsilanti Co.17 In
Adriance v. National Harrow Co.'8 the injunction was granted be-
cause bad faith was shown. From these cases it appears that good
or bad faith is the true test.
One of the clearest indications of bad faith in the patent cases
'114 Mass. 6_ (1873).
1028 Fed. 773 (C. C. Pa. 1886).
"29 Fed. 95 (C. C. Mass. 1886).
134 Fed. 46 (C. C. Ill. 1888).
' Supra, note IO.
" Supra, note ii.
"44 Fed. ig (C. C. Mich. 189o).
isI Fed. 130 (C. C. Wis. 1907).
"Supra, note 15.
is 121 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o3).
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is the refusal to bring suits for the infringement for a long period
during which the libels are continued, and it is not surprising that
the courts should grant an injunction in such cases on these authori-
ties.1
9
Of course the ground for refusal to grant injunctions against
trade libels is the same as for all other libels: it is a denial of free
speech, it is peculiarly adapted to trial by jury, and, there being no
property right directly involved, it is not a class of cases of which
equity will take cognizance. And if these reasons are still valid, it
seems as though the cases involving patents, such as Adriance v. Na-
tional Harrow Co.20 and Electric Renovating Co. v. Vacuum Co.,2
which grant an injunction when bad faith is shown, are not to be
justified, for the reasons apply equally to all trade libel cases. How-
ever, these decisions are now too well recognized to be questioned. The
most that can be done is to find the reason for the extension of the
jurisdiction of equity into this field. The danger of a wrong from
denial of a jury trial is at a minimum, since the cases in which relief
has been granted are confined not only to false statements but also
to those clearly involving bad faith, in which the defendant has really
admitted by his conduct that there is no justification for his course of
action. While it is undoubtedly a restriction of free speech, it is a
restriction in this case which would leave most of us cold, for if
there should be an abridgment of the right of free speech it is in
this situation. And although there is no property right that is di-
rectly involved, injury is caused to a highly protected property right-
exclusive use of one's patent. Equity has not to any great extent
overstepped its historical limitations in thus pursuing a natural tend-
ency to increase its jurisdiction so as to cover such meritorious cases.
And, for the present, it has not only refused to go further afield, but
in coming to its final result in Adriance v. National Harrow Co., it
has overruled such broad decisions as Emack v. Kane.22
The question involved in these cases and that involved in
"American Mercury" v. Chase seems to be the same-an injury to
the plaintiff's business through threats against its customers. The
fact that in one case the threat is of a suit for infringement, and
in the other of a criminal prosecution does not make a difference in
"Electric Renovating Co. v. Vacuum Co., 189 Fed. 754 (C. C. Pa. I911).
'Supra, note 18.
'Supra, note 19.
=Supra, note 12. While the majority of these patent cases have arisen
in the federal courts, the few coming up in the state courts have followed the
same trend, and are not worthy of a separate discussion. Boston Diatite Co. v.
Florence, supra, note 9.
In Hovey v. Rubber Tip Pencil Co., 57 N. Y. 119 (1874), where the cir-
culars were issued in good faith to warn the public, no injunction was granted.
While in Croft v. Richardson, 59 How. Pr. 356 (N. Y. i88o) the threats of
suit were not bona fide and there was no intention of bringing suit, an injunction
was granted. But cf. Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., i1o Mo. 493,
i9 S. W. 804 (1892), in which a right to an injunction in any case of this
sort was denied.
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the problem involved. And yet in the principal case the good faith
of the defendant was not questioned, and there was an additional
guarantee of good faith to be deduced from its prompt prosecution of
prior offenders. There had been no previous jury trial to determine
the truth or falsity of the defendant's statements, and the restriction
of free speech in this case comes.closer to the common conception
of the term than in the slander of title cases. And yet the injunc-
tion was granted against such conduct of the defendant towards fu-
ture issues of the magazine with no method of determining whether
or not the publication of those issues would be criminal or not.
In Pratt Food Co. v. Bird 23 an injunction was sought against a
state food inspector for circulating the information that the plaintiff
food manufacturers had not registered their product according to law,
and that persons dealing with it would be prosecuted. The court re-
fused the injunction on the ground that the law was constitutional,
and that the defendant was not acting illegally. By way of obiter
the court clearly indicated that it was of the opinion that, if the de-
fendant's statements as to his right to prosecute had been untrue,
an injunction could have issued. This mere dictum is the sole prece-
dent in support of the case under consideration. That "American
Mercury" v. Chase goes further than the decisions in analogous
cases would warrant seems clear. That it is wrong for this reason
does not follow. As has been seen above, the jurisdiction of equity
over the realm of libel has beeri increased in late years, and that it
will further increase in the future seems inevitable, if not by statute,
as in England,24 then by judicial decision. It is most certainly a step
forward that has been taken in this case. Let those who believe in
conservatism in the extension of the extraordinary powers of equity
decide in their own minds whether the step taken is too long.
T.P.M.
NEW JERSEY RULE OF ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL-EvIDENCE TO
SHOW WRITTEN INSTRUMENT A "SHAM"--Whether one of the
parties to a written instrument can introduce parol-evidence to show
that it was in reality a "sham" agreement and that the true contract
entered into by the parties was an oral one, is the problem which was
presented to the New Jersey Law Court in the case of Booye v. Ries.,
P sued D in assumpsit on a quantum ineruit for remodeling D's
house. D set up as defense a sealed instrument signed by P. P in
reply admitted the signing, but claimed the written instrument was
merely a "sham." On trial, P wished to introduce testimony to
show that he signed the instrument at the instigation of D solely to
148 Mich. 631, 112 N. W. 701 (0907).
"Judicature Act of 1873, 36 and 37 Vict. c. 66, § 16.
Booye v. Ries, 134 AtI. 86 (N. J. L. 1926).
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assist D to procure the necessary funds for the alterations. He also
wished to prove that both parties had agreed that the written instru-
ment was not to be binding, and that all work was to be done on cer-
tain plans and specifications previously drawn up, which differed ma-
terially from the terms and conditions which were embodied in the
written instrument. This evidence was held inadmissible on the'
grounds that "when a party attaches his signature to a contract, oth-
erwise valid, a conclusive presumption is created, except against
fraud, that the signer read, understood and assented to its terms"
and that parol evidence cannot be introduced to alter, vary, or con-
tradict the terms of a written instrument.
It is advisable, first, to examine the rule of conclusive presump-
tion as used by the court in the principal case and to trace the evolu-
tion of its applications. The presumption of understanding and as-
senting to the contents of a written instrument is, in effect, a rule
that a party who has put his signature to a written instrument, will
not be allowed to assert afterwards, either that he did not know what
he was signing, or that he thought he was signing an instrument the
legal effect of which was different from what he contemplated. This
rule had its origin in an early English case 2 where the signor of a
written instrument, although he was able to do so, failed both to read
the instrument and to ascertain its contents. Afterwards he sought
to avoid the contract by introducing evidence to show that he did not
know the true nature of the instrument. The court held-that such
evidence was inadmissible because it was to be presumed that the
signer had read and understood the instrument. Shortly thereafter,
this rule was adopted by New Jersey in cases involving the same
problem. In Van Deventer v. Van Deventer,3 for example, the plain-
tiff attempted to set aside a bond which she had signed on the
grounds that she had signed it under duress, and without knowledge
of its contents. Her evidence was not strong enough to support her
allegation of duress and the court considered the other question,
whether the instrument was invalid because the signer did not know
its contents. It was decided that in absence of fraud, accident or
mistake, there was a presumption that the signer knew what she was
signing and that she had assented to the terms of the instrument. A
few years later, the same problem was presented in Fivey v. Penn-
sylvania R. R.,' where a railroad employee, who had been injured,
signed an instrument the legal effect of which ivas to relieve the
railroad of liability. There was no question of illiteracy or fraud;
the contract was plain and legible; the employee knew how to read
and write, but he neglected to read the instrument. It was held that
there was a presumption that he knew what he had signed and that
he had assented to the terms of the instrument.
'Lewis v. Great West. R. R., 5 Hurl. & N. 867 (Ex. i86o).
'46 N. J. L. 460 (1884).
467 N. J. L. 627, 52 Atl. 472 (19o2).
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The Fivey case was decided on the authority of the Van
Deventer case, and in the principal case, both the lower and appel-
late courts relied on the Fivey case. But it would seem that the pre-
sumption is not truly applicable to the principal case for two reasons.
First, the plaintiff unhesitatingly conceded a knowledge of, and as-
sent to, the terms of the written instrument; thus all need for the
presumption vanished. That from which he withheld assent was
not the contents of the instrument but rather its status as a contract.
Secondly, in the Van Deventer and Fivey cases, the parties were at-
tempting to deny that any contract existed; in the principal case,
the plaintiff merely denied that this instrument was the contract he
had made. It is submitted that what constituted the intended con-
tract must first be determined under the parol evidence rule before
any presumption can be applied; that here the court applied the pre-
sumption before they had tested the writing by the parol evidence
rule. Having concluded the instrument was a contract they were
then bound to exclude extrinsic evidence.
Had the court first applied the parol evidence rule, should they
have found the writing the contract? It is well established that parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary,- alter, or contradict the terms of a
written instrument.5 In seeming contradiction to this principle is
the rule that evidence is admissible to show that the writing was not
in fact a contract," for in such cases the "parol evidence does not
usurp the place or arrogate the authority of written evidence, but it
is designed to show that the instrument, never - having had legal
existence, ought not to be allowed to operate." 7 Thus evidence would
not be admissible to show that an assignment of store goods was
intended to include "store books"; s that a warranty was given con-
temporaneously with a lease; 9 or that the written instrument did not
embody all the terms of the contract,'0 because in such case, the
"parties have deliberately put their engagement into writing as to
import a legal obligation without any uncertainty as to the extent
of such engagement."" As their expression has been reduced to
writing, the interpretation of the instrument is for the court. On
the other hand, parol evidence may be introduced to prove the want
'Kern v. Voorhies, 3 N. J. L. 557 (183); Cox v. Bennett, 13 N. J. L.
165 (1832); Rogers v. Colt, 21 N. J. L. 704 (1843); Dewees v. Manhattan
Ins. Co., 35 N. J. L. 366 (1872); Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 331 (1882).
For criticism of Naumberg v. Young, see 27 N. J. LAw J. 299 (1904).
U Pym v. Campbell, 6 El. & BI. 370 (K. B. 1856): Burke v. Dulaney, 153
U. S. 228 (1873); Boulevard Globe Co. v. Kern, 67 N. J. L. 279, 51 Ad. 704
(igo) ; O'Brien v. Paterson Brewing Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 117, 61 At. 437 (19o5).
'Perrine v. Cheeseman, ii N. J. L. 174, 177 (1829).
'Taylor v. Sayre, 4 Zabr. 647 (N. J. 1854).
Naumberg v. Young, supra, note 5.
10Supra, note 5.
I GRE.NL.AF, EvInmDcE (i6th ed. 1899) § 275.
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of consideration, 12 the illegality of the subject matter,'
3 that the
agreement was superseded by a new and distinct contract,
14 because
in such cases, the purpose of the testimony is not to vary the terms of
the instrument but to show that it never had legal existence.'
5 The
distinction between these two rules is to be found not in the rules
of evidence, but in the rules of substantive law.'8 The question then.
becomes, which of these two rules should the courts apply when one
is asserting that the written instrument is a "sham"?
Perhaps, the first time the issue was squarely presented to the
New Jersey Law Court was in Wharton v. Christie,'7 where in an
action to recover for wages the defendant set up as his defense a
written resignation signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admitted
the signing but wished to introduce evidence for the purpose of prov-
ing that the alleged resignation was a "sham" and that the parties
never intended it should operate as a resignation. It was held that
this evidence was inadmissible as it would vary the terms of the
written instrument. A few years later, the same problem was pre-
sented in Globe Co. v. Kern,' where in a suit on a written instru-
ment the court allowed a letter to be introduced as evidence, the con-
struction of which tended to show that the written instrument was
never meant to be a contract. It was on the Wharton case that the
court in the principal case relied for its authority that the evidence
offered by the plaintiff would alter the terms of the written instru-
ment.
In the principal case it would seem that the introduction of the
plaintiff's evidence would raise the issue whether the written instru-
ment was the contract made by the parties, the same question as was
involved in the Wharton and Globe cases. If this be true, then the
inference would seem to be that the case would be governed by the
Globe case. The Globe case, however, was dismissed in the princi-
pal case by the words, "It is not in point, as that related merely to
the question whether evidence was admissible to show the purpose
with which a letter was written," and the decision was based on
the Wharton case, which antedated Globe Co. v. Kern. No distinc-
tion was made between these two cases. As was pointed out before,
perhaps the application of the conclusive presumption somewhat
obscured the real issue in the principal case.
That the plaintiff's testimony may well be viewed as altering the
terms of a ;written instrument can be seen from the fact that if one
'Eaton v. Eaton, 35 N. J. L. 29o (1871); Voigt v. Dowe, 74 N. J. Eq.
56o, 70 Atl. 344 (19o8).
"Wooden v. Shotwell, 23 N. J. L 465 (2852).
"Gannon v. Brady Brass Co., 82 N. J. L. 411 (91I).
Supra, note 6. See also infra, note 22.
'Pitcairn v. Hiss, 125 Fed. 1io (19o3).
1T53 N. J. L. 6o7, 23 AtI. 258 (1891).
'67 N. J. L. 279, 51 Ati. 704 (1902).
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signs a note, he cannot thereafter say he signed only as accommoda-
tion surety; 19 nor if one agreed to sell some goods and the terms
were embodied in a written instrument, can one of the parties say
afterwards that certain additional services were promised.20  This is
almost the situation in the instant case-a contemporaneous agree-
ment with different prices and services to be performed. But there
is this difference, that both parties never intended to have the writ-
ten instrument to be the controlling agreement. Some courts have
viewed the situation in a similar light, but with the additional reason
that even though the testimony might be viewed as showing that the
instrument was never meant to have any binding force on the par-
ties, still the court will not allow itself to be an instrumentality in
the perpetration of fraud on third parties who might be affected by
the instrument, even though the suit is between the immediate
parties.
2'
The majority of jurisdictions 22 believe, however, that if a "writ-
ing is understood by the parties to have a particular import and
meaning, it cannot be so diverted from the purpose of its execution
as to fix new and independent liabilities not contemplated when
made." 23  Whether the written instrument in question is the true
contract the parties made, is left as a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury.24  Under this view, evidence is admissible to show
that the defendant signed an order to prevent creditors from attach-
ing certain goods and that the defendant was merely a "straw figure";
and that actually the goods were bought by a third person; 25 that an
advertising agreement was signed to help the other party secure bet-
ter rates from other customers; 20 that a deed was signed but was not
to be operative; 27 or that a note was signed but neither party in-
Honeymoon v. Van Nest, N. J. LAW J. 151 (1881).
"Green v. Watts, go At. 667 (N. J. 1913).
'Graham v. Sage, iio Minn. 5Io, 126 N. W. 394 (393o); Blodgett v.
Marrell, 2o Vt. 5o9 (1848); Grand Isle.Co. v. Kinney,'70 Vt. 381, 4o At. 130
(I898). See, 4 WIG €o , EvMEN c (2d ed. 1923) 3434, 3380. But see Coal
& Iron Co. v. Willing, i8o Pa. 165; 36 Atl. 737 (1897).
"George v. Williams, 27 Col. App. 4o0, 149 Pac. 837 (915); Robinson
v. Nessell, 86 IIl. App. 212 (19oo); Rion v. Reeves, 122 La. 650, 48 So. 138
(igog); Southern St. R. R. Adv. Co. v. Metropole Shoe Mfg. Co., 91 Md.
6I, 46 Atl. 513 (igoo); Birley v. Dodson, I97 Md. 229, 68 AtI. 488 (198) ;
Church v. Chase, iio Mich. 621, 68 N. W. 424 (1896); Coffman v. Malone,
98 Neb. 81g, 154 N. W. 726 (1915) ; Gierson v. Mason, 6o N. Y. 394 (1875) ;
Humphrey v. Timken Carriage Co., 12 Okla. 413, 75 Pac. 528 (19o3). See
Earl G. Harrison, Pennsylvania Rule as to Admissibility of Evidence to Estab-
lish Contemporaneous Inducing Promises to Affect Written Instruments, 74
U. OF PA. L. REv. 235 (1926). For earlier authorities, see 52 Am. L. REG. 6oi
(904).
'Humphrey v. Timken Carriage Co., supra, note 22, at 432, 534.
"Supra, note 22.
"Humphrey v. Timken Carriage Co., supra, note 22.
' Southern St. R. R. Adv. Co. v. Metropole Shoe Mfg. Co., supra, note 22.
"rMcCartney v. McCartney, 93 Tex. 359, 55 S. W. 310 (1900).
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tended the instrument to operate as a note.28  Under this view, it
would therefore seem that the plaintiff's proffer of testimony should
be allowed as it would tend to show that the written instrument was
signed for the purposes alleged.
The New Jersey Court of Chancery has been more willing to
allow the introduction of testimony to show the non-existence of the
contract. Early in 1841, 29 the Chancellor questioned what relief equity
could grant, but when the question came up for a final hearing, the
court adhered to the stand of the law.3 0 Later on, the various chan-
cellors recognized that relief should be given in certain cases.31 But
it was not until 1905 when O'Brien v. Paterson Brewing Co. 32 was
decided that the equity court took a firm stand and definitely allowed
the introduction of such evidence. With that as a basis, the same
court soon followed the decision in a subsequent case.33
It is also interesting to note that whenever this question has
arisen in the New Jersey law courts, the court has always been
divided. In the Wharton case, by a decision of seven to six, the
evidence was excluded, whereas in the Globe case, the evidence was
admitted by an eight-to-five decision. In the principal case, the
court was divided nine to six, and it is therefore rather difficult to de-
termine what course the New Jersey courts of law will pursue when
the question is again presented.
W. G.
' O'Brien v. Paterson Brewing Co., 69 N. J. Eq. i17, 6I AUt. 437 (1905).
But see, Remington v. Wright, 43 N. J. L. 451 (i88i).
'Chetwood v. Brittan, 2 N. J. Eq. 438 (1841).
'Chetwood v. Brittan, 4 N. J. Eq. 334 (1843).
'Stoutenburgh v. Tompkins, 9 N. J. Eq. 332, 336 (1853); Sweet v.
Parker, 22 N. J. Eq. 453 (1871); Van Syckel v. Dalrymple, 32 N. 3. Eq. 233
(1880).
"Supra, note 28.
Oak Ridge Co. v. Toole, 82 N. J. Eq. 541, 88 At. 827 (1913).
